COUNTERING RUSSIAN HYBRID WAR: CYBER MILITIAS AND PMCS
SUMMARY:
The National Defence Strategy strategically manoeuvres America into a new space from fighting terrorism to confronting geopolitical powers in the field of technology (Warner 12). In that field, revisionist adversaries like Russia have innovated in ways to undermine the US and its ally Ukraine (Warner 12). Russia’s strategy of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is a glaring example of the most dangerous threat to US interests. Moscow has innovated in grey-zone parameters with an
astute combination of controlling information and private military contractors. Cyberspace and Private Military Contractors (PMCs) are options that America will need to explore to compete with Russian advancements in East Europe. To compete in this space, we recommend that America seek unconventional allies to strengthen U.S interests.
ISSUE
The United States should be concerned with Russia’s use of unconventional allies and the current ages digital tools. Via a proxy, Moscow can support dissidents with online brigades developing anti-western content geared to areas with existing schizogenesis (Barnes). With state-sponsored tools, Russia cyberattacks Ukraine’s businesses, public service providers, and industrial control systems (Greenburg). While the U.S supports the internet with constitutional values, Russia is developing their iron curtain on its sphere’s ISP (Doffman). To penetrate a closed internet and shape social movements, the U.S will need to find networks of local agitators.
1. CLOSED INTERNET:
The Russian FSB was hacked in 2019, resulting in 7.5 terabytes of data being offloaded (Doffman). The data revealed that Russia is researching ways to prevent or intercept off-grid communications and furthering their plans on an alternative to the World Wide Web (Doffman). America will need to organize and support dissidents within the Russian sphere of influence by recognizing that these parameters may already be in place.
2. INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND COGNITIVE WAR:
Russia has innovated the battlefield with the organized networks of web brigades to support and sponsor Russian interests (Barnes). They have effectively recruited untraditional partners to do the work for them. The web brigades increase the popularity of Russian interests through web content. They leverage division based on class, ethnic, and historical racial discrimination that portrays the Ukrainian government as fascists, Nazi-sympathetic, and anti-Semitic (Sokol, 2019) They then support the anti-Ukrainian narrative with a hacker army that undermines every sector of Ukraine. Resulting in deleted data, destroyed computers, and organizational paralysis (Greenburg). With the physical support of PMCs, Russians coerced local politicians and militias against Ukrainian and U.S interests (BBC 2014).
CONSIDERATIONS:
The Russians in Ukraine shared a similar language, were considered friendly by the population there, and were envied by their financial status vs their Ukrainian counterparts (Sunkahrin 16). Using cultural intelligence provided Russia with an edge in its hybrid warfare strategy. This specific ethnic Russian advantage in Ukraine is a challenge the USA has in developing long-term relations with local militias in East Europe. Ukrainians and Russians are hard to tell apart physically. Aesthetics allows the Russian special forces/PMC to integrate into the security elements of the battleground without revealing the national intention (Sunkahrin 16). Cultural intelligence provides them with the ability to confuse the public on what is true or false.
There needs to be a change in operations on how to influence East Europe by recruiting from their population’s militias and cyber units’ similar organizational structures.
RECOMMENDATION(S):
The Russian approach is not infallible. Options can be explored to contain Russian innovation in warfare.
1) PMC:
When the USA enters a conflict with an outside adversary, Russia has interfered and colluded with PMC and partnered organizations to spoil the department’s foreign policy goals (Plana 2020). The same vulnerability applies to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. There are 30 Ukrainian militias of approximately 50 to 100 personnel. The primary militias are Right Sector, Azov, Aidar, Donbas, and Dnepr (Mironova and Sergatskova 2018). These militias provide plausible deniability, as they empirically are considered autonomous and not within the hierarchy of the government. The DoS has the authority to fund militia activities under Title 10 DOD Authorities (Hicks 28). There are also other amble bases to recruit from within the former Soviet Bloc, such as Georgia and Moldova.
2) DEFECTION RECRUITMENT:
Ukrainian military defection was under the transactional guarantee that Russia could pay higher salaries and the personnel could live a better life (Polityuk and Zverev). Defection to a richer principal state can be taken advantage of. America can innovate from military defection to developing a network to outbid PMC and cyber militias from their principal nation. American-supported “Cyber Brigades” can develop organic and cultural material that confuses and counters the Russian Cyber Brigades cognitive warfare. The same illusion can be developed by recruiting Russian PMCs in Russian backed states to disrupt local power structures.
3) SPONSORSHIP OF NEIGHBOURS:
Russia’s foreign policy has resulted in the dissatisfaction and enmity of former Soviet bloc countries. The USA should pressure Russia by sponsoring militias and cyber units in former Soviet Bloc countries like Georgia and Moldova in addition to Ukraine. The advantage of this strategy is that the USA has a more robust economy than Russia. It would effectively outlast Russia in a military aid spending competition as it did during the Yom Kippur War (Austin 32). The partnerships could develop a consecutive security situation within Former Soviet Bloc countries to disrupt Russian military presence. Russia has failed in the past to manage multiple frontiers of crisis across their sphere of influence.
CONCLUSION: Partnership, Financing, and Guerilla Neo-Soviet Strategies
The Russia Ukraine conflict is a policy experiment for the Russian military enterprise. The combination of state-led information campaigns, cyberattacks, private military proxies, grassroots militias, and special forces has demonstrated that Russia can achieve political goals without international calls for war (Sukhankin 2). DoD should further investigate ways to have military and financial services enhance non-status quo proxies. If America can outbid and provide an economical alternative to Russian proxies, local hacking groups, or subservient countries, it could undermine Russia by its superior economic strength. Money and unconventional allies won the first cold war. Innovation in the current strategy led by the same merit can lead to similar success.
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